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Rethinking democracy promotion
BEATE JAHN*
Abstract. Despite the fact that democracy promotion is a major part of liberal foreign policies,
the discipline of International Relations has not paid much systematic attention to it. Con-
versely, the study of democracy promotion is dominated by comparative politics and pays
hardly any attention to the international system. This mutual neglect signiﬁes a core weakness
in the theory and practice of democracy promotion: its failure to comprehend the development
of liberal democracy as an international process. This article argues that a thorough engage-
ment with John Locke explains the failures of democracy promotion policies and provides a
more comprehensive understanding of the development of liberal democracy.
Beate Jahn is Professor of International Relations at the University of Sussex. She is the
author of The Cultural Construction of International Relations (Palgrave, 2000); ‘Liberal Inter-
nationalism: from ideology to empirical theory – and back again’ in International Theory
(2009), and the editor of Classical Theory in International Relations (Cambridge University
Press, 2006). She is interested in liberal internationalism and in the use of classical theory for
the analysis of International Relations.
Introduction
Democracy promotion constitutes a core aspect of the foreign policy of liberal states
today. Though it has a long history, at least in the foreign policy of the US,1 it has
gained particular prominence after the end of the Cold War with roughly USD 2
billion per year spent on democracy related aid projects.2 And this amount is, since
the end of the Cold War, even outweighed by other international actors like the EU.3
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* I would like to thank Milja Kurki and Christopher Hobson for the invitation to participate in the EU
funded project on the Political Economies of Democracy Promotion which provided the original moti-
vation for my reﬂections on this topic. I have presented earlier versions of this article at the project
workshop in Aberystwyth and at the ECPR conference in Mu¨nster. Thanks are due to all the workshop
participants for their constructive engagement and good ideas. The comments of the anonymous
reviewers helped a lot to clarify the argument and I am grateful to Justin Rosenberg for getting the
penny to drop at the end. The Lockean material in this article has also proven fruitful for my reﬂections
on the relationship between ‘Liberalism and Democracy Promotion’ in Milja Kurki and Christopher
Hobson (eds), Political Economies of Democracy Promotion (forthcoming).
1 Michael Cox, G. John Ikenberry, and Takashi Inoguchi, ‘Introduction’, in Michael Cox, G. John
Ikenberry and Takashi Inoguchi (eds), American Democracy Promotion. Impulses, Strategies, and Im-
pacts (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), p. 10.
2 Thomas Carothers, Critical Mission: Essays on Democracy Promotion (Washington: Carnegie Endow-
ment for International Peace, 2004), p. 2.
3 Michael McFaul, ‘Democracy Promotion as a World Value’, The Washington Quarterly, 28:1 (2005),
p. 156.
Despite these efforts, however, democracy promotion policies have, at best, ‘very
modest’ success.4 Failures attended both major post-World War II periods of
‘democracy promotion’. Modernisation theories5 informed the ﬁrst such period and
focused on ‘various national preconditions and deep structural factors’ such as ‘levels
of socioeconomic development, degrees of socioeconomic equality and group polariza-
tion, patterns of land ownership or agricultural production, the prevalence of certain
beliefs or cultural traits’ which modernisation policies then sought to manipulate
through aid and assistance in the military, economic, and political ﬁelds.6 These
policies largely failed to achieve their stated aims7 and their failures, in turn, were
widely blamed on the lack of a strong, coherent, and well-substantiated theoretical
basis:8 on ‘our lack of knowledge about the long causal chains running from outside
help to internal conditions to changes of regime’.9 One of the weaknesses of democracy
promotion has thus been identiﬁed as its tendency to focus on ‘impulses, strategies,
impacts’,10 that is, to frame the issue either as a matter of foreign policy on the part
4 Stephen E. Finkel, Anibal Perez-Linan, Mitchell A. Seligson, and Dinorah Azpuru, Effects of US
Foreign Assistance on Democracy Building: Results of a Cross-National Quantitative Study (Vanderbilt
University, 2006), p. 86; Carothers, Critical Mission, p. 5. Larry Diamond, Developing Democracy:
Toward Consolidation (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1999), p. 23.
5 Though modernisation theories and policies are sometimes excluded from the ﬁeld of democracy pro-
motion, I include them for two reasons: ﬁrst, because the ﬁeld of democracy promotion has historically
developed out of modernisation theories (the theoretical basis for modernisation policies) with strong
continuities between the two (see Paul Cammack, Capitalism and Democracy in the Third World: The
Doctrine for Political Development (London: Leicester University Press, 1997)); secondly, excluding
modernisation policies on the grounds that they focus on economic development would logically lead
to an exclusion of the entire ‘economic’ strand of democracy promotion theories and policies.
6 Gideon Rose, ‘Democracy Promotion and American Foreign Policy: A Review Essay’, International
Security, 25:3 (2000/1), p. 191; Beate Jahn, ‘The Tragedy of Liberal Diplomacy: Democratization,
Intervention, Statebuilding I’, Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding, 1:1 (2007a), pp. 94–102.
7 Michael E. Latham, Modernization as Ideology: American Social Science and ‘Nation Building’ in the
Kennedy Era (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2000); Robert A. Packenham,
Liberal America and the Third World: Political Development Ideas in Foreign Aid and Social Science
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1973).
8 Hans-Ulrich Wehler, Modernisierungstheorie und Geschichte (Go¨ttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht,
1975); Ian Roxborough, ‘Modernization Theory Revisited’, Comparative Studies in Society and History,
30:4 (1988), pp. 753–61; Cammack, Capitalism and Democracy; Charles Tilly, ‘Reﬂections on the
History of European State-making’, in Charles Tilly (ed.), The Formation of National States in Western
Europe (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975a), pp. 3–83; Charles Tilly, ‘Western State-making
and Theories of Political Transformation’, in Charles Tilly (ed.), The Formation of National States in
Western Europe (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975b), pp. 601–38.
9 Robert A. Dahl, Polyarchy. Participation and Opposition (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1971),
pp. 209–10.
10 Cox et al., American Democracy Promotion; Jonas Wolff and Iris Wurm, ‘Towards a Theory of External
Democracy Promotion? Approximations from the Perspectives of International Relations Theories’,
unpublished manuscript, presented at the ISA conference in New Orleans (2010); Maria Green Cowles,
James Caporaso and Thomas Risse (eds), Transforming Europe: Europeanization and Domestic Change
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2001); Amichai Magen, Thomas Risse, Michael A. McFaul (eds),
Promoting Democracy and the Rule of Law. American and European Strategies (Basingstoke: Palgrave,
2009). For the role of democracy promotion in US foreign policy, see Colin S. Cavell, Exporting ‘Made-
in-America’ Democracy, The National Endowment for Democracy and US Foreign Policy (Lanham:
University Press of America, 2002); Tony Smith, A Pact With the Devil: Washington’s Bid for World
Supremacy and the Betrayal of the American Promise (New York: Routledge, 2007); Tony Smith,
America’s Mission. The United States and the Worldwide Struggle for Democracy in the Twentieth
Century (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994); Cox et al., American Democracy Promotion;
Thomas Carothers, Aiding Democracy Abroad. The Learning Curve (Washington: Carnegie Endowment
for International Peace, 1999); Thomas Carothers, In the Name of Democracy: US Policy Toward
Latin America in the Reagan Years (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991); Jack Donnelly,
‘Democracy and US Foreign Policy: Concepts and Complexities’, in David P. Forsythe (ed.), The
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of liberal states or as a matter of domestic political and economic development
in target states. What this framing leaves untheorised, however, are the relations
between sponsors and targets, that is, its international dimension.11
The second period of democracy promotion policies was triggered by ‘The Third
Wave’ of democratisation12 in which political factors seemed to play an important
role and thus gave rise to a more optimistic assessment of the possibilities of inﬂuenc-
ing such developments from the outside. ‘As the 1990s progressed, however, the
bloom came off the rose . . . Despite the expenditure of billions of dollars and count-
less hours of effort . . . most of the various democracy promotion efforts had little
to show for themselves.’13 While empirical studies of such failures identify a host
of contributing factors, theoretical weaknesses remain a problem,14 speciﬁcally the
failure to link political institutions to the ‘social requisites of democracy’.15
Policies of democracy promotion thus suffer from two conceptual weaknesses: the
ﬁrst consists in a tension between the political and economic dimensions of liberal
democracy generating calls ‘to reconnect the socioeconomic and political spheres
in both theory and practice’.16 The second lies in the theoretical separation of the
domestic and international dimensions of liberal democracy promotion.17 These two
weaknesses are interrelated, I will argue, and provide the basis for contradictory
democracy promotion policies.
The argument is based on the assumption that the theoretical fragmentation of
contemporary conceptions of liberal democracy and its promotion is the product of
historical development; speciﬁcally of the separation of politics and economics and
of their domestic and international dimensions in modern liberal democratic societies
which ﬁnds expression in the development of separate academic disciplines of
Politics, Economics (or Development Studies) and International Relations (IR). The
analysis of democracy promotion ‘sits awkwardly in between the disciplines of inter-
national relations, comparative politics, development studies, and law – related to all
United States and Human Rights: Looking Inwards and Outwards (Lincoln: The University of Nebraska
Press, 2000), pp. 199–226; William I. Robinson, Promoting Polyarchy: Globalization, United States
Intervention and Hegemony (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996); William I. Robinson, A
Faustian Bargain: US Intervention in the Nicaraguan Elections and American Foreign Policy in the
Post-Cold War Era (Boulder: Westview Press, 1992); and its comparison with other states Magen, Pro-
moting Democracy; Peter J. Schraeder, Exporting Democracy: Rhetoric vs. Reality (Boulder: Lynne
Rienner, 2002); Richard Youngs, The European Union and the Promotion of Democracy (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2002). The impact of democracy promotion is discussed in Finkel et al.,
Effects; James M. Scott, and Carie A. Steele, ‘Assisting Democrats or Resisting Dictators? The Nature
and Impact of Democracy Support by the United States National Endowment for Democracy, 1990–
99’, Democratization, 12:4 (2005), pp. 439–60; Stephen Knack, ‘Does Foreign Aid Promote Democracy?’
International Studies Quarterly, 48:1 (2004), pp. 251–66. A discussion of its ideological basis and norma-
tive goals can be found in Smith, A Pact With the Devil; McFaul, Democracy Promotion; Nicolas
Guilhot, The Democracy Makers. Human Rights and International Order (New York: Columbia Univer-
sity Press, 2005). Exceptions to this general trend are Mark Peceny, Democracy at the Point of Bayonets
(University Park: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1999); Robinson, Promoting Polyarchy; Jahn,
‘Tragedy’ I and II.
11 Rose, ‘Democracy Promotion’, p. 209.
12 Samuel P. Huntington, ‘Democracy’s Third Wave’, Journal of Democracy, 2:2 (1991), pp. 12–34.
13 Rose, ‘Democracy Promotion’, pp. 192–3.
14 Carothers, Critical Mission, p. 5; Rose, ‘Democracy Promotion’, p. 202.
15 Larry Diamond, Developing Democracy: Toward Consolidation (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University
Press, 1999), p. 57; Carothers, Aiding Democracy, p. 341.
16 Rose, ‘Democracy Promotion’, p. 201.
17 Ibid., p. 203.
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four but not ﬁnding a home in any one’.18 As a product of the fragmentation of
social scientiﬁc knowledge, each of these disciplines provides tools designed for the
analysis of its respective domain – distinguishing it from, rather than relating it to,
the others. Such shortcomings of disciplinary fragmentation are, of course, widely
recognised and addressed by calls for, and support of, interdisciplinary research.
And yet, combining the research methods or ﬁndings of different disciplines does
not overcome the fundamental separation which is constitutive of these methods,
and hence their results, in the ﬁrst place. Instead, as the democracy promotion litera-
ture clearly shows, such combination frequently results in listing a variety of relevant
factors generated by different approaches without establishing the nature of their
relationship and/or in ‘master narratives’ based on one approach with others simply
providing auxiliary material ﬁlling the theoretical gaps left by the former. In short, as
products of such disciplinary fragmentation, contemporary analytical categories do
not lend themselves to providing a holistic account of the development of liberal
democracy. Instead, reading the history of the development of liberal democracy
through the lenses of these analytical categories, as contemporary approaches to
democracy promotion do, simply results in a fragmented narrative or account of
that history. One solution to this problem lies in returning to a time prior to this
fragmentation. Hence, I will use the work of John Locke to develop and assess a
more holistic conception of the development of liberal democracy.
Contemporary models of democracy promotion are generally derived from an
interpretation of the historical development of liberal democracy in the West. In the
ﬁrst section I will show that these models fall into two broad categories – a political
approach and an economic approach – in line with contemporary disciplinary divi-
sions. The political approach fails to theorise the relationship between the political
and economic dimensions of liberal democracy. The economic approach, in contrast,
accounts for this relationship between politics and economics at the domestic level,
but fails to theorise the relationship between the domestic and international dimen-
sions of the development of liberal democracy. Theoretically, I will argue, these two
approaches are ultimately incompatible and they give rise to potentially contradic-
tory democracy promotion policies.
In the second section I will turn to the work of John Locke whose reﬂections on,
and advocacy of, liberal democracy apply to the same history, yet prior to the
contemporary disciplinary fragmentation. Locke’s work, I will show, provides a con-
ception of the establishment and democratisation of liberalism based on an explicit
theorisation of the relationship between politics and economy in which, moreover,
the international sphere plays a constitutive role. Comparison with contemporary
models shows, moreover, that despite its normative character, this Lockean concep-
tion accounts more accurately for the subsequent historical development of liberal
democracy than either of the contemporary approaches and it provides explanations
for the weaknesses of policies based on the latter.
This alternative conception of democracy promotion, I will conclude, calls for a
fundamental rethinking of democracy promotion in theory and practice. Speciﬁcally,
it suggests that a realistic analysis of the history of liberal democracy and the pros-
pects of its promotion requires the theoretical integration of its international dimen-
sion. And this in turn necessitates a shift away from the comparative method which
stands in the way of such an integration.
18 Carothers, Critical Mission, p. 2.
688 Beate Jahn
Contemporary approaches to democracy promotion
A clear deﬁnition of ‘democracy promotion’ is rather difﬁcult to come by, partly
because ‘democracy’ is a highly contested concept whose meaning ranges from
majoritarian or popular rule, through the institution of elections through which this
rule is often, but not always, established, to respect for individual rights even in the
absence of a general franchise.19 In line with this theoretical confusion, the term
‘democracy’ has historically been applied to a wide variety of political communities –
ranging from indigenous tribal societies through ancient Greek city states and
contemporary ‘illiberal’ or ‘authoritarian’ democracies to modern Western liberal
democracies.20 While the term ‘democracy’ remains essentially contested, the ‘rise
of illiberal democracy’21 since the mid-1990s has led to a clariﬁcation of the goal
of ‘democracy promotion’ policies. Such policies, it became clear, were ultimately
neither content with the introduction of elections nor with respect for liberal values.
Instead, democracy promotion policies aim to establish the kind of polities that pro-
vide the model for democracy promotion: ‘modern, representative, liberal, political
democracy as practiced within nation-states’22 – for short, liberal democracy.
Liberal democracy in turn is understood as a conglomerate of characteristics
generally found in, or associated with, European (settler) states. These states and
their transition to democracy provide the main model for both major periods of
democracy promotion since the Second World War: modernisation theories and
policies in the 1950s and 60s23 and transition theories and democracy promotion
policies especially in the 1990s.24 In addition, the case of South Africa seemed to
prove that democratisation was possible in deeply divided societies; Spain became a
model for step-by-step democratisation of authoritarian regimes; and Hungary and
Poland played a similar role for the ‘triple’ transition from communism.25 Finally,
the cases of Germany and Japan after the Second World War are frequently cited in
support of the notion that democracy can successfully be promoted by foreign actors.
It is, nevertheless, the history of Western liberal democratic states that provides
the basis for the main theoretical approaches to democracy promotion. These fall
into two broad groups, a political and an economic approach, in line with the dis-
ciplinary distinction between politics and economics. These two approaches, I will
now show, provide rather different and at times contradictory interpretations of the
history of liberal internationalism.
19 Marc F. Plattner, Democracy Without Borders? Global Challenges to Liberal Democracy (Lanham:
Rowman and Littleﬁeld, 2008), p. 48; Giovanni Sartori, ‘How Far Can Free Government Travel?’
Journal of Democracy, 6:3 (1995), pp. 101–11.
20 Plattner, Democracy, pp. 10–1; Georg Sørensen, ‘The Impasse of Third World Democratization: Africa
Revisited’, in Cox et al., American Democracy Promotion, p. 290; Barry Gills, ‘American Power, Neo-
Liberal Economic Globalization and ‘‘Low Intensity Democracy’’: An Unstable Trinity’, in Cox et al.,
American Democracy Promotion, pp. 326–44.
21 Fareed Zakaria, ‘The Rise of Illiberal Democracy’, Foreign Affairs, 76 (1997), pp. 22–43.
22 Philippe Schmitter, ‘Transitology: The Science or the Art of Democratization?’, in Joseph S. Tulchin
(ed), The Consolidation of Democracy in Latin America (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1995), p. 15.
23 Jahn, ‘Tragedy’.
24 Larry Diamond, ‘Is the Third Wave Over?’, Journal of Democracy, 7:3 (1996), p. 35; Roland Paris,
‘Peacebuilding and the Limits of Liberal Internationalism’, International Security, 22:2 (1997), p. 57;
Jahn, ‘Tragedy’ II.
25 Laurence Whitehead, ‘Losing ‘‘the Force’’? The ‘‘Dark Side’’ of Democratization After Iraq’, Democrati-
zation, 16:2 (2009), pp. 217–19.
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According to the political approach, the emergence and democratisation of
liberalism in Europe and America has its roots in a particular political culture –
characterised by secularisation and the ‘taming of politics’ which led to the ‘inven-
tion’ of liberal ideas.26 The subsequent expansion of liberalism is explained by ‘the
spread of liberal ideas of the natural freedom and equality of all human beings’
which ‘doomed any special and substantial privileges enjoyed on the basis of heredity’
and ‘eventually undermined any effort to exclude people from political participation
on the basis of such factors as race, religion, or sex’.27 This explanation is supported
with reference to the fact that it was the ruling elites themselves who eventually outbid
each other in extending the franchise,28 and with reference to the comparatively early
introduction of universal (male) suffrage in America, assumed to be rooted in a rela-
tively progressive political imagination on the part of American citizens who had left
the traditional hierarchical political societies of Europe behind.29
Theoretically, this political approach sees liberalism or individual freedom as a
‘necessary condition’ for democracy30 which explains the sequential development of
liberalism and democracy in much of European and American history. According
to this account, constitutional liberalism is ‘naturally ‘‘democratic’’’.31 Yet, if the
freedom of the individual is a precondition for democracy, than the latter must not
be confused with majority rule.32 After all, ‘there is reason to fear that a government
responsive to popular majorities will be tempted to violate the rights of unpopular
individuals or minorities’.33 In this view, only liberal democracies are democracies –
even if they limit the franchise.34
This development of liberal and democratic political institutions was historically
frequently accompanied by technological and economic development.35 Yet, while
economic development is widely seen as ‘very helpful’ for the process of democratisa-
tion, it is ‘neither a necessary nor a sufﬁcient condition for stable democracy’.36 Since
liberalism was, a hundred years ago, not at all associated with providing economic
beneﬁts, ‘a ‘‘poor democracy’’ is equally conceivable and possible’.37 Indeed, eco-
nomic development itself, according to this account, has its roots in technological
innovation which, in turn, was made possible by the culture of logic and rationality
the West inherited from ancient Greece.38 In short, both economic and technological
development as well as liberal political institutions have their roots in a particular,
Western, political culture.
The political approach thus adds economic development as a helpful factor but
fails to provide a theoretical account of its role in the development of liberal democracy
26 Sartori, ‘Free Government’, p. 104.
27 Plattner, Democracy, p. 67.
28 Ibid., p. 66.
29 Ibid., p. 62.
30 Sartori, ‘Free Government’, pp. 101–2.
31 Viktor J. Vanberg, ‘On the Complementarity of Liberalism and Democracy – A Reading of F.A.
Hayek and J. M. Buchanan’, Journal of Institutional Economics, 4:2 (2008), p. 143.
32 Ibid., pp. 146–7.
33 Plattner, Democracy, p. 60.
34 Sartori, ‘Free Government’.
35 Russell Bova, ‘Democracy and Liberty: The Cultural Connection’, Journal of Democracy, 8:1 (1997),
p. 116; Francis Fukuyama, ‘Capitalism and Democracy: The Missing Link’, Journal of Democracy,
3:3 (1992a), p. 108.
36 Fukuyama, ‘Capitalism and Democracy’, p. 108.
37 Sartori, ‘Free Government’, p. 105.
38 Ibid., p. 106; Francis Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man (London: Penguin, 1992b).
690 Beate Jahn
(in comparison with other ‘helpful’ factors such as Western culture and values, religion,
ethnicity) or of its relationship to liberal political institutions.39 It thus attaches addi-
tional factors to the political ‘master narrative’ without integrating them theoretically.
Ultimately, the political approach holds ‘that the philosophy of liberalism contains
within itself the seeds of its own democratization’.40
Democracy promotion policies based on this narrative therefore identify a tradi-
tional political culture as the main barrier to the development of liberal democracy
and propagate policies focusing on the spread of liberal ideas and institutions. These
prominently included such issues as elections, citizenship, civil society, the rule of
law, decentralisation, anticorruption, and others that are designed to address pre-
cisely this political backwardness.41 Generally, however, these policies do not achieve
‘the hoped-for dramatic results’.42 While they are often successful in establishing
democratic institutions, these institutions are subsequently frequently used to pursue
decidedly illiberal policies.43 In short, most countries do not follow the path outlined
by the historical model derived from European political development.44
These failures of the political approach and its neglect of the economic dimension
of liberal democracy have given renewed impetus to the second historical narrative
which focuses on economic forces of transformation. It is based on the assumption
that the protection of private property is a ‘sacred’ principle of liberalism45 which
played a crucial role in triggering economic and technological development. Initially,
this protection of private property ran counter to the interests of a majority of the
population, that is, of the poor who did not hold any property. Historically, liberals
thus widely resisted the introduction of democracy on the grounds that giving the
vote to the poor would simply result in the plunder of the rich – and hence in
the end of civilisation.46 Thus, both Macaulay and Ricardo were ready to extend
suffrage only to those social groups ‘which cannot be supposed to have an interest
in overturning the right to property’.47
According to this account, liberalism and democracy are initially incompatible.
And yet, over time the protection of private property and the resulting technological
and economic development made possible a wider spread of property within society,
and consequently an extension of the franchise to wider sections of society, hence the
differential pace of democratisation in Europe and America. America was blessed
with abundant land, a small population, and the absence of a traditional propertied
class which led to rapid economic development. Europe, in contrast, suffered from a
comparatively limited supply of land, a large population, and the presence of a tradi-
tional propertied class. And yet, since economic development and democratisation
39 Bova, ‘Democracy and Liberty’, p. 116; Fukuyama, ‘Capitalism and Democracy’, p. 108.
40 Plattner, Democracy, p. 60.
41 Carothers, Critical Mission, p. 5; Plattner, Democracy, p. 53.
42 Carothers, Critical Mission, p. 5.
43 Ibid.; Sheri Berman, ‘Re-Integrating the Study of Civil Society and the State’, in Zoltan Barany and
Robert G. Moser (eds), Is Democracy Exportable? (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009),
pp. 37–56; Jeroen De Zeeuw and Krishna Kumar (eds), Promoting Democracy in Postconﬂict Societies
(Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2006).
44 Thomas Carothers, ‘The End of the Transition Paradigm’, Journal of Democracy, 13:1 (2002), p. 18.
45 Plattner, Democracy, p. 67.
46 Ibid., pp. 64–5.
47 Cited in Adam Przeworski, ‘The Neoliberal Fallacy’, Journal of Democracy, 3:3 (1992), p. 53; Plattner,
Democracy, p. 65.
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ultimately occurred in both cases, observers suggest that economic development is, in
principle, possible anywhere.48
The economic approach thus recognises the constitutive role of private property,
or economic development more generally, for the constitution and democratisation
of liberalism.49 ‘Few relationships between social, economic, and political phenomena
are stronger than that between the level of economic development and the existence of
democratic politics’.50 Conversely, ‘poverty is a principal – probably the principal –
obstacle to democratic development’.51 Democracy promotion policies based on this
approach thus aim to trigger economic development by following the European and
American example, that is, by propagating privatisation and marketisation (more or
less rapidly). And yet, despite following the successful models of economic develop-
ment in the West, the results of these policies are extremely uneven – ranging from
some highly successful to apparently hopeless cases. Income disparities are rising and
it seems to be very difﬁcult in some cases to break ‘the bonds of poverty’.52
These failures of economic approaches to democracy promotion as well as the
fact that economic development does not always lead to democracy have led observers
to argue that economic development, or capitalism as the source of this development,
is a ‘necessary – though not sufﬁcient – condition for democracy’.53 Parallel to the
political approach, analysts thus list additional conditions like Western culture and
values54 as well as state capacity, a secure social and political order, horizontal
accountability and the rule of law, lack of corruption, strong political parties linked
to social groups, a coherent party system, autonomous capacity and public account-
ability of legislatures and local governments, and a vigorous civil society.55
The attempt to theorise the connection between economic development and such
additional factors has given rise to a wide variety of studies exploring the political
implications of the distribution of property,56 the development of the public sector,57 the
impact of economic modernisation on cultural change, and subsequently democracy.58
48 Plattner, Democracy, p. 68; Samuel P. Huntington, ‘Democracy’s Third Wave’, Journal of Democracy,
2:2 (1991), p. 33.
49 This constitutive relationship as well as the potential incompatibility of liberalism and democracy
underpins contemporary debates concerning the beneﬁts of authoritarian regimes in pushing through
initially painful economic reforms necessary to trigger economic development (see Zakaria, ‘Illiberal
Democracy’; Barbara Geddes, ‘Challenging the Conventional Wisdom’, Journal of Democracy, 5:4
(1994), pp. 104–18) as well as debates over shock-therapy in the context of communist transitions
(Przeworski, ‘The Neoliberal Fallacy’, p. 56).
50 Huntington, Democracy’s Third Wave, p. 30; Adam Przeworski, Michael E. Alvarez, Jose Antonio
Cheibub, and Fernando Limongi, Democracy and Development. Political Institutions and Well-Being in
the World, 1950–1990 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), p. 273.
51 Huntington, ‘Democracy’s Third Wave’, p. 31.
52 Przeworski et al., Democracy and Development, p. 277.
53 Peter L. Berger, ‘The Uncertain Triumph of Democratic Capitalism’, Journal of Democracy, 3:3 (1992),
p. 11; Philippe Schmitter, ‘Dangers and Dilemmas of Democracy’, Journal of Democracy, 5:2 (1994),
p. 66; Jagdish Bhagwati, ‘Democracy and Development’, Journal of Democracy, 3:3 (1992), p. 40; Larry
Diamond, ‘Three Paradoxes of Democracy’, Journal of Democracy, 1:3 (1990), pp. 50, 59.
54 Samuel P. Huntington, ‘Democracy for the Long Haul’, Journal of Democracy, 7:2 (1996), p. 4.
55 Diamond, ‘Third Wave’, p. 33.
56 Daron Acemoglu and James A. Robinson, Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2006).
57 Carles Boix and Susan Carol Stokes, ‘Endogenous Democratization’, World Politics, 55:4 (2003),
pp. 517–49.
58 Ronald Inglehart and Christian Welzel, Modernization, Cultural Change, and Democracy (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2005); Ronald Inglehart and Christian Welzel, ‘How Development Leads
to Democracy’, Foreign Affairs (March/April 2009).
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Yet, this research tends to be based on comparative studies and focuses entirely on
the relationship between economics and politics within the state – that is, on the
domestic sphere.
Indeed, while the ‘internationalisation’ of modernisation processes in the context of
globalisation59 has recently been noted, this development is taken to be historically
unprecedented.60 All historical attempts at modernisation ‘conceived of development
as a project linked to national economic and political independence’, based on
national cultures, political traditions, national industries, and local markets; in
contrast, it now involves a ‘partial surrender of national sovereignty in the political,
economic, and cultural realms’ opening markets to foreign penetration, abolishing
cultural barriers, and advocating political institutions developed abroad.61 Hence,
the international dimension of the development of liberal democracy is seen as a
recent phenomenon that radically breaks with the historical record underpinning
conventional models.
In sum, then, conceptions of democracy promotion can be broadly divided into a
political and an economic approach. Both approaches are based on an interpretation
of the history of liberal democracy in European (settler) states and seek to pro-
vide explanations for core phenomena of this history: the sequential development of
liberalism and democracy, the differential pace of democratisation in the compara-
tive cases of Europe and America, the nature of the historical link between economic
and political development. Yet, the resulting explanations differ considerably. The
political approach locates the roots of liberalism in a particular political culture and
the economic approach in economic development; the political approach argues that
liberal values contain the seeds of democratisation (ultimately convincing the ruling
classes) while the economic approach views liberalism (and its ruling classes) as
opposed to democracy and identiﬁes economic development as the necessary condi-
tion for democratisation; for the political approach early democratisation in settler
states is the result of a progressive political culture and for the economic approach
it follows the distribution of private property; for the political approach, economic
development is helpful but unnecessary while it is constitutive of political democracy
for the economic approach.
The substantive differences between these two approaches provide the basis for
different, and at times contradictory, democracy promotion policies, either focusing
on support for economic development which is then expected to lead to political
democratisation as in the case of modernisation policies, or providing support for
democratic political institutions as in the post-Cold War period. Yet, support for
economic development in the form of privatisation and marketisation – as suggested
by the model of successful Western liberal democracies – may well run counter to the
interests of the majority of the population and thus undermine political democratisa-
tion. Meanwhile, support for democratic political institutions may well stand in the
way of moves towards privatisation and marketisation.
There exists, then, clearly a tension between the political and economic dynamics
of liberal democracy which is not resolved in either of the existing approaches. And it
is arguably this tension that leads academics as well as practicioners to separate the
59 Przeworski, ‘The Neoliberal Fallacy’, p. 55; Acemoglu and Robinson, Economic Origins, pp. 347–8.
60 Przeworski, ‘The Neoliberal Fallacy’, p. 55.
61 Ibid.
Rethinking democracy promotion 693
economic and political dimensions of liberal democracy promotion even while their
combination is widely recognised as providing the most conducive conditions for
democratisation. Hence, theories as well as policies tend to prioritise one or the
other; the different policies are pursued at different times introducing phases of
democracy promotion; they are undertaken by different actors. While governments
generally pursue both policies, different ministries focus on different policies; while
NGOs in general cover both dimensions, particular NGOs tend to focus on one or
the other; while international organisations pursue both policies, different institutions
will pursue different policies (the UN focusing on the political, the IMF on the
economic, and so on). The tension between these two core dimensions of liberal
democracy thus remains unresolved in academic as well as political practice. And
yet, historically this tension has been sufﬁciently resolved to lead to the establishment
of some mature and stable liberal democracies. And it is a thorough engagement
with John Locke’s reﬂections, I will show in the next section, that provides an answer
to the question: how?
The Lockean alternative
Despite the considerable differences between these contemporary approaches to
democracy promotion, both are based on the interpretation of the historical develop-
ment of European/American liberal democracy – the same history to which John
Locke’s reﬂections also apply albeit in his case with fore- rather than hindsight. His
work thus offers a perspective on the development of liberal democracy prior to the
disciplinary fragmentation which underpins the contemporary, and contradictory,
interpretations of this history.
In Locke’s work ‘the central elements of the liberal outlook crystallized for the
ﬁrst time into a coherent intellectual tradition expressed in a powerful, if often
divided and conﬂictual, political movement’.62 It is thus not surprising that Locke
is widely mentioned in the democracy promotion literature.63 For the most part,
however, these references to Locke are fairly cursory and do not entail a serious
engagement with his theory. Such an engagement is nevertheless fruitful, I will
show, because Locke offers an account of the development of liberalism and its
democratisation which theorises the relationship between domestic and international
politics and economics.
I will begin by setting out Locke’s theoretical conception of the constitution and
democratisation of liberalism as a purely heuristic device whose explanatory potential
is subsequently compared with the contemporary approaches. Locke’s work certainly
invites and deserves a systematic critique which goes, however, beyond the scope
of this article. Core areas of contention and critique will nevertheless emerge in the
exposition of the historical consequences of the Lockean promotion of liberal democ-
racy as well as in its implications for contemporary democracy promotion.
Like most classical authors, Locke begins his reﬂections on government with
assumptions about the state of nature. This state of nature of all men, he argues, is
62 John Gray, Liberalism (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1986), p. 11.
63 Plattner, Democracy; Sartori, ‘Free Government’, pp. 101–2; Claude Ake, ‘Devaluing Democracy’,
Journal of Democracy, 3:3 (1992), pp. 33–4.
694 Beate Jahn
‘a State of perfect Freedom to order their Actions, and dispose of their Possessions, and
Persons as they think ﬁt’.64 Yet, upholding this freedom requires self-preservation.65
And it is this requirement, Locke argues, that can only be fulﬁlled if ‘every Man has
a Property in his own Person’ and ‘the Labour of his Body and the Work of his
Hands’.66 Self-possession, property in one’s person and the fruit of one’s labour,
thus allows individuals ‘the taking any part of what is common, and removing it
out of the state Nature leaves it in, which begins the Property’.67 According to Locke,
the right to private property therefore exists already in the state of nature, and it is
this right that underpins and upholds the natural freedom of the individual who
would otherwise perish.68 Locke supports this theoretical argument with reference
to the historical origins of government largely based on information about indigenous
communities in America.69 ‘Men are naturally free, and the Examples of History
shewing, that the Governments of the World . . . had their beginning laid on that
foundation, and were made by the Consent of the people’.70 And since this freedom
is based on property, the ‘great and chief end therefore (of government) is the Preser-
vation of their Property’.71
Locke thus naturalises the (in fact man-made) right to private property which
provides the necessary basis for individual freedom; such free individuals then demand
government by consent which in turn has to protect private property as the basis for
their freedom. In short, Locke argues that individual freedom is and must be based
on private property for without private property the individual is necessarily dependent
on others for its survival and thus not free.
Yet, this ideal formulation did not reﬂect the social and political conditions at the
time of Locke’s writing. In fact, it was precisely because most governments in
Locke’s time and throughout history had not been governments by consent, and
because private property had not necessarily been protected, that Locke developed
this theory and propagated it against the prevailing political positions, such as
Filmer’s defence of paternal government which he attacks in the ﬁrst treatise.72 In
practice, he thought it ‘evident that there is a difference in degrees in men’s understand-
ings, apprehensions, and reasonings to so great a latitude, that one may, without doing
injury to mankind, afﬁrm, that there is a greater difference between some men and
others in this respect, than between some men and some beasts’.73 A liberal polity
could therefore not be established by simply introducing elections. Locke thus had to
show how society could be based on the principles of private property and government
64 John Locke, Two Treatises of Government, ed. Peter Laslett (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1994), p. 269.
65 Ibid., p. 271.
66 Ibid., pp. 287–8.
67 Ibid., p. 289.
68 Ibid., pp. 289, 294.
69 Naeem Inayatullah and David L. Blaney, International Relations and the Problem of Difference (New
York: Routledge, 2004), pp. 35–43; Beate Jahn, The Cultural Construction of International Relations:
The Invention of the State of Nature (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2000).
70 Locke, Two Treatises, p. 336.
71 Ibid., p. 351.
72 Locke developed a philosophy of history explaining such counterevidence. In a nutshell, he argued that
while states had originally been established on the basis of consent, over time rulers exploited their
position and justiﬁed authoritarian government with reference to illiberal custom and tradition that
gradually shaped the political imagination of the people; Locke, Two Treatises, pp. 329, 343.
73 John Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, 2 Vols., collated and annotated by Alexander
Campbell Fraser (New York: Dover, 1959), p. 446.
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by consent in the absence of a majority of individuals supporting such developments
or, conversely, how the majority of the population could be made sufﬁciently rational
to establish and maintain such a polity. In other words, Locke saw himself confronted
with the task of promoting ‘liberalism’ in a non-liberal environment.
Locke’s solution to this problem was faithful to the fundamental premises of his
theory – and in particular to the linkage between freedom and private property. If
private property was the basis of individual freedom, Locke argued, property owners
would demand that government protect private property and hence their freedom.
He thus advocated the extension of full political rights to property owners only –
and the concomitant denial of these rights to those who did not own property.
‘Paternal Power is . . . where Minority makes the Child incapable to manage his
property; Political where Men have Property in their own disposal; and Despotical
over such as have no property at all’.74
This solution, however, directly contradicted his claim that, in principle, all
people were born free and equal and thus had a right to consent to government.
Moreover, Locke saw the tiny minority of property owners, ‘the rich’, who would
have been accorded full political rights, as ‘mostly corrupt’.75 Hence, Locke was
interested in extending the franchise and, perfectly in line with his theory that private
property provides the basis for individual freedom and the rights that follow from
this, he argued that an extension of the franchise could be achieved by turning
more, and ideally all, sections of society into property owners. This was a neat
theoretical solution, but in practice it threw up the problem where all this additional
property was to come from. Once private property had been naturalised and Locke
had committed himself to its protection, redistribution was not an option. So, Locke
argued that private property was more productive than common property and thus
of greater beneﬁt to all of humankind.76 It was therefore justiﬁed to turn common
into private property: God gave the land ‘to the use of the Industrious and Rational’.77
People could simply attain property by mixing their individual labour with the original
common property. The privatisation of common property was thus the solution to
the problem.
Assuming that land – at the time the most important additional source of wealth –
in England was too scarce to provide the vast and rising number of poor with
property, Locke looked abroad: ‘Yet there are still great Tracts of Ground to be
found, which . . . lie waste, and are more than the People who dwell on it, do, or can
74 Locke, Two Treatises, p. 384. This does not mean that the emancipatory potential of Locke’s thought is
strictly limited to property owners. Locke simply aims to exclude those deemed unable or unwilling
to uphold this principle as foundational for society from political rights. Once based on this principle,
society could curtail individual property rights for purposes of international competition and defence
and in order to allow every individual to fulﬁl its rights and obligations to God – that is, to work for
its upkeep. See Barbara Arneil, John Locke and America. The Defence of English Colonialism (Oxford:
Clarendon, 1996), p. 159; James Tully, A Discourse on Property. John Locke and his Adversaries
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), p. 63; John Dunn, The Political Thought of John
Locke. A Historical Account of the Arguments of the Two Treatise of Government (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1969), p. 246; Peter Laslett, ‘Introduction’, in John Locke, Two Treatise of Govern-
ment, ed. Peter Laslett (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), p. 105. Similarly, political
rights could be extended to non-property owners well socialised into the principles and practices of
such a society.
75 Dunn, John Locke, p. 217.
76 Locke, Two Treatises, pp. 296–8.
77 Ibid., p. 291.
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make use of, and so still lie in common.’78 It was this common land in America
which could be used, at least in principle, to furnish all individuals with property
and thus make them eligible to full political rights. In short, ‘Locke . . . was offering
the New World, speciﬁcally the colonial settlements of America, as validation of his
sociopolitical philosophy’.79 According to this theory, the expansion of liberalism
and its subsequent democratisation required three steps: ﬁrst political rights were to
be given to property owners only who would establish a liberal society; secondly,
common property could then be expropriated and transformed into private property
thus increasing the number of property owners; and thirdly, on the basis of this wider
distribution of property, political rights could be extended.80
Historically, the establishment of liberalism and its eventual democratisation
broadly followed the trajectory outlined by Locke. First, land owners and merchants
who had become rich from the trade with the colonies – among them Locke’s own
long-time patron, the Earl of Shaftesbury – increasingly demanded political rights
with direct reference to their property which led to a huge increase of members in
the House of Commons.81 And these men subsequently used their political power to
institutionalise the protection of private property on which their individual freedom
rested. In other words, this development led to the establishment of a liberal state
characterised by the transference of de jure political power into the hands of commercial
and capitalistic interests and the stabilisation of property rights in seventeenth-century
Britain.82
Once in power, however, these men were not content with securing the existing
property arrangements but systematically engaged in the transformation of common
into private property – both in the domestic and the international sphere. Thus,
Locke’s work was frequently cited in Parliament in support of private enclosure acts
which, between 1710 and 1815, transferred 6.5 million acres or 20 per cent of the
total land from common into private property.83
These domestic policies were accompanied by the propagation of colonialism in
which the Earl of Shaftesbury and Locke himself played a crucial role. Locke was
secretary to the Lord Proprietors of Carolina (1668–71), secretary to the Council of
Trade and Plantations (1673–4), a member of the Board of Trade (1696–1700),
he invested in the slave-trading Royal Africa Company (1671) and the Company
of Merchant Adventurers to trade with the Bahamas; he was a Landgrave of the
78 Ibid., p. 299.
79 Herman Lebovics, ‘The Uses of America in Locke’s Second Treatise of Government’, Journal of the
History of Ideas, 47:4 (1986), p. 577.
80 Locke’s work allows for a more progressive interpretation based on his argument that the transfor-
mation of common into private property was justiﬁed only ‘where there is enough, and as good left in
common for others’ (Two Treatises, p. 288). This limitation on the practice of transforming common
into private property can be, and has been, used to justify a liberal ‘welfare state’ with quite con-
siderable limitations on private property (for example, James Tully, A Discourse on Property. John
Locke and his Adversaries (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982)). The early development of
liberal democracy in Europe and America was nevertheless largely based on the ‘conservative’ interpre-
tation set out here.
81 Michael Perelman, The Invention of Capitalism: Classical Political Economy and the Secret History
of Primitive Accumulation (Durham: Duke University Press, 2000), p. 175; Acemoglu and Robinson,
Economic Origins, p. 350.
82 Acemoglu and Robinson, Economic Origins, pp. 349–50.
83 David McNally, Political Economy and the Rise of Capitalism: A Reinterpretation (Berkeley: University
of California Press, 1988), pp. 62, 8–9; Perelman, Invention of Capitalism, p. 175. McNally reports that
in 1710 the ﬁrst private enclosure act was presented in Parliament, followed by 100 between 1720–50,
139 between 1750–60, 900 between 1760–79, and 2000 between 1793–1815 (p. 11).
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proprietary government of Carolina, wrote parts of the Fundamental Constitutions
of Carolina, handled the day to day correspondence with the colonists in Carolina,
and Edisto island was originally called Locke island. His writings, political and
theoretical, cover all aspects of colonialism and consistently defend it.84 And it
was these writings, particularly Locke’s theory of property, that ‘preachers, legal
theorists, and politicians’ used to base ﬁrst the land claims of the British colonists
and then those of the American citizens on the enclosure and cultivation of land.85
The same argument was also inﬂuential in Australia, New Zealand, Canada through-
out the eighteenth and well into the nineteenth century.86 These colonial policies thus
allowed European colonists to acquire property and, perfectly in line with the
dynamic outlined by Locke, it was in settler societies like New Zealand, the US,
and Australia that the promise based on such wider distribution of property – the
introduction of universal franchise – was ﬁrst realised.
In Europe, meanwhile, the gradual democratisation of liberalism was similarly in
line with Locke’s theory. Until well into the nineteenth century, voting rights were
limited by property qualiﬁcations and liberals widely and passionately resisted the
extension of the franchise on precisely the grounds that Locke had set out: namely
that those who did not own property could not be expected to support and maintain
laws protecting private property. Such resistance was necessary because the poorer
sections of society vociferously demanded political rights. Upheavals, rebellions, and
the threat of revolution were widespread and integral features of society: rulers had
to be forced to give up power.87 Yet, it was precisely the ruling elite’s resistance to
extending the franchise which ultimately guaranteed the liberal character of Western
democracy.88 For the enclosure of commonly owned land domestically, colonial
appropriation of land internationally, and the industrial revolution all contributed
to economic growth that led to a wider distribution of property in society – in line
with the widely noted link between economic development and liberal democracy.89
In other words, a sizable middle class slowly emerged and allowed liberals to lower
the property threshold for voting rights gradually, thus extending the franchise – but
only to those sections of society that had actually achieved a measure of individual
freedom based on private property and who therefore had a stake in upholding the
liberal character of government. Thus, general evidence suggests that a successful
democratisation of liberalism requires the inviolability of property rights.90
84 James Tully, An Approach to Political Philosophy: Locke in Contexts (Cambridge: Cambridge Univer-
sity Press, 1993), pp. 140–1; Richard Tuck, The Rights of War and Peace: Political Thought and the
International Order from Grotius to Kant (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), p. 167. On Locke’s
support for colonialism, see also Arneil, John Locke and America; David Armitage, ‘John Locke,
Carolina, and the ‘‘Two Treatise of Government’’ ’, Political Theory, 32:5 (2004), pp. 602–27; David
Boucher, ‘Property and Propriety in International Relations: The Case of John Locke’, in Beate Jahn
(ed.), Classical Theory in International Relations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006),
pp. 156–77.
85 Arneil, John Locke and America, p. 169.
86 Duncan Ivison, ‘Locke, Liberalism and Empire’, in Peter R. Anstey (ed.), The Philosophy of John
Locke: New Perspectives (London: Routledge, 2003), p. 93.
87 Charles Tilly, Contention and Democracy in Europe, 1650–2000 (NY: Cambridge University Press,
2004); Kyong-won Kim, ‘Marx, Schumpeter, and the East Asian Experience’, Journal of Democracy,
3:3 (1992), p. 24.
88 Bova, ‘Democracy and Liberty’, p. 116; Ake, ‘Devaluing Democracy’, pp. 33–4.
89 Przeworski et al., Democracy and Development; Acemoglu and Robinson, Economic Origins, p. 58.
90 Acemoglu and Robinson, Economic Origins, p. 82; Daniel Chirot, ‘Does Democracy Work in Deeply
Divided Societies?’, in Zoltan Barany and Robert G. Moser (eds), Is Democracy Exportable? (Cambridge:
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Moreover, the transformation of common into private property remains at the
core of liberal strategies to foster economic growth today. The last two decades
have seen a remarkable revival of liberalism in the form of market economics, the
privatisation of state-owned industries, and the trimming of welfare beneﬁts by liberal
democracies.91 This latest round of ‘privatisation’ and ‘liberalisation’ targeted com-
munal ownership of water and electricity supplies, education, health care, and the
establishment of ‘new enclosures’ in the form of intellectual property rights over
natural products and their uses.92 Policies of privatisation and marketisation also lie
at the core of the development policies of international organisations like the IMF
and World Bank as well as those of individual liberal states.
The Lockean conception of the establishment and democratisation of liberalism
thus appears to be broadly in line with the historical development of liberal democracy
in Europe and America. Hence, I will now use the remainder of this section to show
that this Lockean integration of the domestic and international, political and economic
dimensions of liberal democracy accounts more comprehensively for the historical
development of liberal democracy than either of the contemporary approaches.
The political approach, as we have seen, assumes that liberalism has its roots in
a particular ‘secular’ or tolerant, ‘tame’, and ‘rational’ political culture in Europe.
This claim, however, is directly contradicted by the fact that the period before the
emergence of liberal ideas at the end of the seventeenth century was characterised
by the bloodiest civil war in English (and European) history – a war, no less, which
was in large part religious. The ‘invention’ of liberal ideas, in the case of Locke, for
example, was thus not the result of a secular, tame, and rational political culture.
Instead, Locke’s formulation of what later became core principles of liberalism is
more accurately understood as an attempt to ﬁnd a solution to the problem of
religious violence.93 This solution lay in the ‘privatisation’ of religion, in a clear
distinction between the private and the public sphere. The public sphere, ‘political
society’ says Locke, ‘is instituted for no other end but only to secure every man’s
Possession of the things of this life’ and thus has no right to adjudicate on matters
of the afterlife.94 Conversely, while individuals may follow their particular faiths
in the private sphere, they may not ‘obtrude those things upon others, unto whom
they do not seem to be the indubitable Doctrines of the Scripture’.95 This ‘privatisa-
tion’ of religion, if practiced, does indeed remove religion as a cause of civil conﬂict
and thus leads to a ‘taming’ of political culture in this respect. But it requires the
protection of the private sphere which in turn is based on the protection of private
property.
Moreover, this solution to the problem of religious conﬂict must not be confused
with tolerance (despite the fact that Locke called his essay on this question ‘a letter
concerning toleration’). For tolerance is conceptually tied to groups, not individuals,
and practiced in the public sphere, so that the ‘privatisation’ of religion ‘has elided
91 Plattner, Democracy, p. 68.
92 Christopher May, A Global Political Economy of Intellectual Property Rights (London: Routledge,
2000).
93 Inayatullah and Blaney, International Relations, p. 35.
94 John Locke, A Letter Concerning Toleration, ed. James H. Tully (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing
Company, 1983), p. 48.
95 Locke, A Letter, p. 57.
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the problem of tolerance, obviated the necessity to be tolerant, rather than make
people tolerant’.96 Hence, secularisation, the ‘taming of politics’, and ‘tolerance’ are
historically not a cultural precondition for the emergence of liberalism but rather its
consequence and as such based on the economic and legal development of private
property and the private sphere.
And it is this protection of private property which also provides a more plausible
explanation of technological and economic growth than the inheritance of a logical
and rational ancient Greek culture. For even if Greek (or Muslim, for that matter)
culture play a role in the technological and economic development generated in
Europe, it is ‘the development of property rights over discoveries and intellectual
goods, along with the existence of a competitive market economy and a tradition of
academic freedom to experiment’97 that explains its timing.
Hence, the origins of liberal ideas are better explained by the interests of rich land
owners and merchants (as well as Locke himself in the employ of one of these) who
pursued political rights for the purpose of securing their property, and thus also their
freedom, from state intervention. If liberalism is subsequently not associated with
providing economic beneﬁts to larger sections of the population,98 this does not
prove its independence from economic foundations but rather the opposite: It was
because voting rights were based on property that there was no need to make
economic concessions to poorer sections of the population – until the latter had
gained sufﬁcient political strength to challenge this arrangement. In short, the roots
of liberalism lie, as Locke and the contemporary economic approach hold, in the
protection of private property.
Further, the claim that the logic of liberal values leads to democratisation and
that this logic was ultimately internalised by ruling elites and, conversely, that the
main hindrance to the introduction of democracy lies in a traditional political imag-
ination99 is equally undermined by the history of radical political upheavals in
Europe throughout this entire period – attesting not to a traditional but rather to a
radical political imagination.100 ‘The evidence’, conclude Acemoglu and Robinson,
‘is . . . consistent with the notion that most moves toward democracy happen in the
face of signiﬁcant social conﬂict and possible threat of revolution. Democracy is
usually not given by the elite because its values have changed. It is demanded by the
disenfranchised as a way to obtain political power and thus secure a larger share of
the economic beneﬁts of the system’.101 Indeed, it was the resistance of the ruling
elite that ultimately ensured the liberal character of Western democracy because it
provided time for economic development and consequently a wider distribution of
property within society. When, ﬁnally, political concessions had to be made, voting
rights could be extended gradually to propertied citizens alone who now had a stake
in upholding a political system based on the protection of property.102
96 Adam B. Seligman, ‘Democracy, Civil Society, and the Problem of Toleration’, in Barany and Moser,
Is Democracy Exportable?, p. 125.
97 Arturo Fontaine Talavera, ‘The Future of an Illusion’, Journal of Democracy, 3:3 (1992), p. 113.
98 Sartori, ‘Free Government’, p. 105.
99 Plattner, Democracy, p. 62.
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Contemporary explanations by both approaches for the differential pace of
democratisation in Europe and America are similarly unsatisfactory. The political
approach assumes a more progressive political imagination of the American popula-
tion. And yet, the radical and violent history of Europe during that period clearly
contradicts the assumption of a backward attachment to hierarchical political struc-
tures in Europe. Meanwhile, the assumption of the economic approach that early
American democratisation was triggered by advanced economic development does
not account for the fact that British technological and economic development for
much of that period surpassed its American counterpart without leading to early
democratisation.
The Lockean approach, in contrast, does not treat the issue as a case of com-
parative but separate domestic developments. Though early democratisation was
indeed made possible in America (and other European settler states) because in these
states property was more widely distributed amongst the population. Yet, the reason
for this spread of property did not lie in domestic economic development per se.
Rather, it was colonialism, the expropriation of indigenous, that is, ‘foreign’, political
communities that generated a relatively wide spread of property in America. Expro-
priation through colonialism, however, does not pitch different sections of the same
political community against each other. Instead, it created an alliance of interest
between all settlers; ruling elites had nothing to fear, but a lot to gain, from extend-
ing the franchise in settler communities. The dynamic relationship between domestic
and international politics thus accounts for what in terms of contemporary ap-
proaches appears as contradictory evidence: a radical political imagination in Europe,
yet early democratisation in America; advanced economic development at least in
parts of Europe, yet a wider spread of property in America.
It is this theoretical integration of the domestic and international political and
economic dimensions of liberal democracy which provides a more comprehensive
account of the constitution of liberalism and its democratisation in general. After
all, it was the power differentials between European and non-European societies in
the Americas, and later in other parts of the world, that enabled Locke to offer the
appropriation of foreign land as a means to widen the distribution of property within
domestic European societies as a precondition for the extension of the franchise to
wider sections of society – a precondition which liberalism reduced to the domestic
sphere could not have met, partly because its protection of private property pre-
cluded internal redistribution and partly because further appropriation of domestic
communal property met its limit in widespread and violent resistance that could
easily have turned into outright revolution. Colonialism, in short, is now widely
regarded as having played a crucial role for economic development in Europe.103 In
addition, it provided political and material relief in this fraught situation. It allowed
the ruling elite to pursue a large part of its economic goals abroad, thus not adding
to the already heavy pressure on the domestic poor. It allowed the domestic poor and
politically disenfranchised to emigrate and thus relieved the political pressure on the
government. And it allowed the government to export its poor, its criminals, its
103 Robert B. Marks, The Origins of the Modern World. Fate and Fortune in the Rise of the West (Lanham:
Rowman and Littleﬁeld, 2007); David Washbrook, ‘From Comparative Sociology to Global History:
Britain and India in the Pre-History of Modernity’, Journal of the Economic and Social History of the
Orient, 40:4 (1997), pp. 410–3.
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orphans as well as to offer employment in the administration of the colonies. Colo-
nialism provided common political ground for rich and poor alike and thus bridged
the gap between their otherwise mutually exclusive interests. And by doing so, it also
enabled European elites to resist demands for political rights long enough for a
sizable middle class to emerge. In short, the claim that the development of liberal
democracy was historically a domestic or national phenomenon which has only
recently been undermined by interdependence or globalisation is simply false. Both
European and American economic development as well as the subsequent democrat-
isation of their political institutions have been triggered by, and dependent on, inter-
national economic opportunities whose exploitation in turn was dependent on radical
power differentials.
The Lockean account, ﬁnally, provides a theoretical explanation for some of the
systematic contradictions arising out of contemporary democracy promotion policies.
It suggests that policies promoting the spread of liberal ideas and institutions are
based on the false assumption that ‘the slave must be educated slowly and painfully
to understand that he or she is a human being with a unique dignity that can best be
recognized by certain kinds of social and political institutions’.104 Instead, ‘the slave’
is fully aware of his or her dignity and demands its recognition quite frequently.
These political demands, however, will only lead to a liberal political culture if they
are based on the spread of private property within society. Inasmuch as the survival
of individuals and their real existing freedom depends on communal property and
redistribution (ethnic, religious, or otherwise), ‘indifference’ towards these communities
is not an option – as nationbuilding processes have shown historically.105 In short, the
Lockean theory provides an explanation for the ironic fate of many policies focusing
on political institutions: while these policies are successful in establishing and spreading
such institutions, in the absence of the required economic preconditions the latter are
then frequently used to pursue highly illiberal policies.106
Similarly, it provides a theoretical explanation for the disjuncture between the
economic model and its practice, that is, for the rising gap between rich and poor
states that makes economic development in ‘late, late developing countries (mainly
in Africa)’ so much more difﬁcult.107 Unlike Europe at the beginning of its develop-
ment, contemporary poor states are also weak states within the international order.
They do not enjoy the opportunity of privatising other communities’ property or of
exporting the negative consequences of domestic privatisation into the international
sphere. On the contrary, they operate within an international economic and political
system that has been set up in the interests of the rich and powerful liberal democratic
states. And these interests, precisely because the latter have become democratic,
continue to lie in growth necessary to provide economic beneﬁts to their own popu-
lations. Hence, these states have a strong incentive to keep the terms of the inter-
national economic and political order in their favour. The international order thus
provides the framework demarcating the possibilities and limits of political and
economic development for individual states suggesting that policies of democracy
104 Fukuyama, ‘Capitalism and Democracy’, p. 107.
105 Chirot, ‘Does Democracy Work’, p. 101.
106 Carothers, Critical Mission; Berman, ‘Civil Society and the State’; De Zeeuw and Kumar, Promoting
Democracy.
107 Huntington, ‘Democracy’s Third Wave’, p. 33.
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promotion must address these systemic constraints in addition to, and in combination
with, their propagation of particular strategies on the part of targets and sponsors.
Conclusion
What, then, are the implications of Locke’s understanding of liberalism for the con-
temporary debate on democracy promotion? Ultimately, Locke’s reﬂections show
that the international sphere plays a crucial and constitutive role in the development
of liberal democracy – and it is the failure to recognise and theoretically integrate
this international dimension which leads to the weaknesses, contradictions, and failures
of democracy promotion.
The basis for this conclusion lies in Locke’s reﬂections on the complex and
contradictory relations between politics and economics at the heart of liberalism. If
private property is indeed constitutive of individual freedom and hence a liberal
political culture, then the spread of liberal democracy requires the spread of private
property. Since the protection of existing private property within liberalism precludes
redistribution to this end, the spread of private property is achieved through the
privatisation/expropriation of communal property which in turn removes the pre-
conditions for the development of a liberal political culture in communities subject
to expropriation. Providing the conditions for the development of liberalism in one
section of society therefore simultaneously removes these conditions from others
and hence leads to deep economic and political divisions rather than to stable liberal
democracies.
Locke believed that the international sphere could play a crucial role in mitigat-
ing these tensions. He thus advocated colonialism as a means to temper the negative
consequences of ‘liberalisation’ within domestic society. In Locke’s normative theory
the international sphere functions as a kind of valve which allows for the relief of
internal pressure through external appropriation as well as the export of the negative
consequences of internal expropriation. Subsequent historical evidence supports this
Lockean theory and shows that the international did indeed play a constitutive role
for the establishment and democratisation of today’s mature liberal democratic
states.
And it is this constitutive role of the international that is missing from contem-
porary democracy promotion literature. For the most part, the latter explicitly holds
that liberal democracy is historically the product of endogenous ‘national economic
and political independence’ which has only recently been affected by international
forces in the form of globalisation.108 This integration of the international dimension
in the form of globalisation into the debate on democracy promotion rightly draws
attention to the importance of international opportunities and constraints for domestic
democratisation processes. And it gives rise to the demand that scholars and prac-
ticioners ‘should care at least as much about the World Trade Organization’ as they
do about the impact of assistance for elections or support for civil society.109
108 Przeworski, ‘The Neoliberal Fallacy’, p. 55.
109 Rose, ‘Democracy Promotion’, p. 201.
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And yet, this belated empirical recognition cannot entirely ﬁll the gap left by
the failure to theoretically integrate the constitutive role of the international for the
development of liberal democracy. For it misses the fact that liberal democracies
themselves play a constitutive role in the production of non-liberal states and in that
of the structures and dynamics of the international system itself. While globalisation is
often presented as an external force that potentially interferes with domestic policies,110
Locke’s work draws attention to the fact that it is the result of the foreign policies of
liberal democratic states themselves. Since the political survival of liberal democracies,
precisely because they have become democracies, requires the constant reproduction of
the economic foundations of that regime – that is, of economic growth and beneﬁts
to its own population – liberal democracies cannot help but engage in international
power politics with the aim to shape the international economic and political order in
their favour. And it is this mutually constitutive role of domestic and international
politics which explains the often contradictory nature of liberal foreign policies:
pursuing ‘neoliberal economic reforms’ on the one hand that frequently ‘undercut
the political reforms’ of their democracy promotion programmes on the other.111 In
other words, Locke’s theory makes sense of the observation that democracy promo-
tion policies often amount to a programme for the advancement of market liberalism.
More generally, it is the failure to integrate the international dimension into the
theoretical conception of liberal democracy promotion which leads to a disjuncture
between expectations and outcomes. And it is the mutually constitutive role of
domestic and international politics in this ﬁeld that explains empirical variation. It
suggests that the development of a stable liberal democracy is successful if and
when domestic and international conditions (ranging from opportunities for appro-
priation through political struggles to the structure of the international order) are
conducive to the spread of private property within society. In the absence of attempts
to spread private property or under domestic and international conditions that
frustrate such attempts, a stable liberal democracy is unlikely to develop.
To be sure, the historical role of international politics for the development and
democratisation of liberalism – in the form of colonialism for the production of
capital as well as political actors and identities, for instance112 – is sometimes em-
pirically recognised. But such insights are not integrated into the theoretical concep-
tion of liberal democracy promotion and the comparative method that dominates the
ﬁeld and essentially places distinct and separate cases next to each other for purposes
of comparison. Yet, in so doing this method fails to take into account the crucial
interactive dimensions of democracy promotion. More importantly, however, the
logic of comparison leads to policies of emulation. ‘Latecomers’ are expected to
follow, broadly, in the footsteps of successful predecessors. Yet, if the dynamic rela-
tions between the political, economic, domestic, and international are constitutive of
actors, their interests and policies as well as the international system at large, then
emulation is not an option. ‘Latecomers’ will here always be confronted with con-
ditions for democratisation that are by deﬁnition different from those encountered
by their predecessors.
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In short, the Lockean theory undermines the assumption that the development of
liberal democracy is largely a matter of domestic politics or bilateral relations of
assistance; instead, it suggests that the political and economic structure of the inter-
national system in general and the international policies of powerful liberal demo-
cratic states within that system in particular crucially shape the opportunities and
constraints for democracy promotion. And it is in the sense of studying relations
between, rather than comparing distinct cases of, international actors that the call
for the ‘application of the tools of international relations to the subject matter of
comparative politics’113 must be understood and is long overdue.
113 Rose, ‘Democracy Promotion’, p. 189.
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